Abstract. In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform inefficiency, corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources (Debreu [12]). I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for uniform inefficiency in terms of prices at a competitive equilibrium: an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if the relative price of the aggregate endowment in a given period into the aggregate endowment up to that period does not vanish over periods of trade, a sort of Modified Cass Criterion (Cass [10]). Minimal assumptions on fundamentals are needed for such a complete characterization. Furthermore, proofs reduce to simple and short direct arguments. Finally, I verify that uniform inefficiency is preserved under perturbations, a property that might fail for the canonical notion of inefficiency. Remarkably, an allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if a non-vanishing redistribution, like a social security mechanism, is welfare improving.
Introduction
In this paper, I introduce a notion of uniform inefficiency corresponding to the presence of a welfare improvement with a small uniform destruction of available resources (Debreu [12] ). In a general economy of overlapping generations, I provide an equivalent characterization of uniform inefficiency in terms of competitive equilibrium prices. In particular, for nearly stationary competitive equilibria, uniform I am grateful to Herakles Polemarchakis, Pietro Reichlin, Paolo Siconolfi and Mario Tirelli for their interesting comments. I also acknowledge the valuable suggestions of an anonymous referee for the improvement of both presentation and analysis. I finally thank participants to the 2004 PRIN Workshop held in Alghero in June 2006. An earlier version of this paper was circulated as [6] . Remaining errors, omissions and misunderstandings are my own responsibility.
inefficiency occurs if and only if the implicit real rate of interest is negative in the long-run.
Several pieces of work in the literature provide conditions for efficiency in terms of equilibrium prices in economies of overlapping generations, inspired by the studies of Cass [10] and Benveniste [4, 5] on capital theory. The initial characterizations of Balasko and Shell [2] and Okuno and Zilcha [15] for canonical two-period overlapping generations economies were extended by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [13] to growing (or declining) economies, by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [11] to economies with uncertainty and by Burke [7] and Molina-Abraldes and PintosClapés [14] to economies with heterogeneous horizons for generations. Furthermore, in a related paper, Richard and Srivastava [16] proposed a pure duality approach to economies with the double infinity of individuals and commodities, clarifying its inadequacy for economies of overlapping generations.
To the purpose of comparison, I shall briefly present the crucial elements of the characterization established in the literature omitting minor details. In the simplest framework, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto inefficient if and only if the so-called Cass Criterion holds in terms of equilibrium prices. More precisely, at a competitive equilibrium, Such an equivalence obtains under rather technical restrictions on preferences referred to as conditions of non-vanishing curvature and bounded curvature of indifference curves. These assumptions, which are substantially innocuous over a single individual, are to be satisfied uniformly across individuals of all generations. The notion of uniform inefficiency introduced in this note allows for a complete characterization in terms of equilibrium prices under weaker restrictions on fundamentals than those appearing in the literature. In fact, at a competitive equilibrium, uniform inefficiency of allocation if and only if lim inf
This only requires an hypothesis that rules out preferences converging to nonsmooth utilities, which is no more restrictive than the traditional bounded curvature condition. It is easily verified that lim inf
which is consistent with the fact that the set of uniformly inefficient allocation is smaller than the set of simply inefficient allocations. The condition for uniform 1 Here, as in the following discussion, p t represents the vector of (Arrow-Debreu) commodity prices prevailing in period t.
inefficiency is equivalent to the existence of some 1 > ρ > 0 such that
Thus, an equilibrium allocation is uniformly inefficient if and only if the value of the (bounded and non-vanishing) intertemporal aggregate endowment grows at a geometric rate over periods of trade.
An economic interest for uniform inefficiency relies on its robustness to slight perturbations, that is, uniform inefficiency is an open property in some appropriate uniform topology. To the best of my knowledge, an equivalent property has not been established (and, probably, fails) for the canonical notion of inefficiency.
2
Policy intervention is motivated by a failure of efficiency in competitive markets. In this perspective, the doctrine would lack foundation if inefficiency were to depend on the precise distribution of resources across individuals. Instead, verifying uniform inefficiency does not require the exact knowledge of consumption plans and preferences, so as correcting uniform inefficiency does not impose an extremely precise redistribution of resources.
Uniformly efficient allocations are dually characterized by supporting linear functionals defined over the relevant commodity space, exactly as in economies with finitely many individuals. However, in economies of overlapping generations, such linear functionals might not admit any sequential representation, so preventing their interpretation as competitive prices (see Richard and Srivastava [16] ). Importantly, an equivalent characterization fails for simply efficient allocations, as a non-uniformly inefficient allocation might well be supported by a linear functional. This suggests that uniform efficiency represents a natural extension of the canonical notion of efficiency to economies of overlapping generations.
Finally, as a comparison with the established results in the literature, under some sort of bounded and non-vanishing curvature assumptions, I verify that a uniformly efficient allocation is not efficient only if Pareto improving trades vanish eventually. Thus, uniform inefficiency occurs if and only if a non-vanishing redistribution, such as a social security mechanism consisting in a reduction of consumption in the first period for an increase in the second period of activity of every generation, delivers a Pareto improvement.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe a general economy of overlapping generations. In section 3, I introduce the notion of uniform inefficiency and verify its robustness to perturbations. In section 4, I provide a duality analysis by showing that uniform efficiency corresponds to supportability by means of positive linear functionals that are defined on the relevant commodity space. In section 5, I present the notion of competitive prices, jointly with the hypotheses corresponding to those of bounded curvature and non-vanishing curvature of indifference curves. In section 6, which represents the major contribution of this paper, I show that uniform inefficiency is equivalently characterized by a Modified Cass Criterion in terms of competitive prices, under restrictions that are substantially weaker than those in the literature. In section 7, I compare the characterization in this note with the literature, by showing that, when a uniformly efficient allocation fails efficiency, then any Pareto improvement eventually vanishes over periods of trade. Finally, in section 8, I present some brief remarks on practicable extensions of the analysis. All proofs are collected in appendix A. A brief digression about CES utility functions and the hypothesis of smooth support, which is used for the equivalent characterization, is presented in appendix B.
Fundamentals
I shall consider general economies of overlapping generations under the hypothesis of two-period horizons for generations. No additional restrictions are imposed on the (finite) sizes of generations and the (finite) sets of physical commodities that are traded in every period. Also, growth is allowed. In order to simplify notation, I shall first introduce general assumptions on fundamentals and then restrict attention to economies with generations operating over two-period horizons and overlapping in a single period only.
There is a countably infinite set L of (dated and, possibly, contingent) commodities. Consistently, the commodity space is L = R L . 3 There is a countably infinite set V j∈J x j denote, if they exist, the supremum and the infimum, respectively. Finally, L + = {x ∈ L : x ≥ 0} is the positive cone of L. Similar definitions apply to (Riesz) vector subspaces of L. For an element e of L, the principal ideal L (e) = {v ∈ L : |v| ≤ λ |e| for some λ > 0} is a (Riesz) vector subspace of L, with an associated supremum norm, v = inf {λ > 0 : |v| ≤ λ |e|}. For details, I refer to Aliprantis and Border [1] . 4 Given an element v of L, for every t in T , v t denotes its algebraic projection in L t .
individual i in G 0 , and, for every
. Thus, finitely many commodities are traded in every period of trade t in T , represented by the vector space L t , and infinitely many generations, each consisting of finitely many individuals, overlap in a single period of trade, with generations G t and G t+1 overlapping only in period t in T .
As any economy of overlapping generations can be reduced to the described simple structure (Balasko, Cass and Shell [3] ), the restrictive assumption is that individuals in the same generation desire the same set of commodities, that is, their preferences are strictly monotone over the same set of commodities. This hypothesis rules out many instances of economies of overlapping generations, beginning with uncertainty if individuals are distinguished on contingencies. It is only motivated by the need of analytical tractability and could be substantially weakened at the cost of heavy notation and qualifications.
An allocation x is an element of
Given an allocation x in X, the aggregate endowment of commodities is e = i∈G x i , a strictly positive element of L. Notice that infinite sums are well-defined, as generations are of finite cardinality and overlap in a single period only. Some additional pieces of notation will be used throughout the analysis. For every t in T , γ t denotes the cardinality of generation G t . In addition, with some abuse of notation, γ i is the cardinality of the generation t in T of individual i in G.
Finally, t (i) in
T is the first period of activity of individual i in G.
Uniform Inefficiency
An allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in X whenever,
It is efficient whenever it is not inefficient. This canonical notion of efficiency is weakened in order to provide a full characterization through competitive prices.
An allocation x in X is uniformly inefficient if it is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in X satisfying, for some 1 > > 0,
Thus, an allocation is uniformly inefficient when a Pareto improvement obtains notwithstanding a uniform small destruction of available resources. To simplify presentation, though terminology might be misleading, I shall state that an allocation is uniformly efficient whenever it is not uniformly inefficient. Clearly, any efficient allocation is uniformly efficient, but the converse is false. I shall here verify robustness of uniform inefficiency. Proximity of allocations is measured in terms of variations of consumption plans with respect to the average aggregate endowment of commodities. More precisely, a neighborhood of an allocation x in X is, for some > 0, of the form
where e in L is the aggregate endowment. Notice that
(The left inclusion holds true because generations overlap in a single period only.) Thus, a neighborhood of an allocation consists of all perturbations of consumption plans of individuals that are bounded by the average aggregate endowment. Such perturbations induce slight variations in the aggregate consumption, as, for every allocation z in N (x),
In an economy with an upper bound on the cardinality of generations, it is equivalent to adopt the canonical supremum norm induced by the aggregate endowment. With a growing cardinality of generations, perturbations of an allocation in this canonical supremum norm would yield unbounded variations in the corresponding aggregate consumption. Uniform inefficiency is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to robust Pareto dominance by means of a redistribution of resources. That is, there exists an alternative feasible allocation of resources such that any sufficiently small perturbation of this redistribution Pareto improves upon the initial allocation. This is of some relevance for policy intervention, as it implies that any slight distortion in the implementation of a policy (or in the operating of competitive markets) might still be compatible with a welfare improvement upon a uniformly inefficient allocation. Contrarily, correcting non-uniform inefficiency imposes an extremely precise redistribution of resources. 
Proposition 1 (Robust Pareto dominance). An allocation x in X is uniformly inefficient only if there exists
A relevant feature of uniform inefficiency is its persistence to small perturbations. Under further restrictions on preferences, if an allocation is uniformly inefficient, so is any other allocation in a small neighborhood. Relevantly, this implies that to ascertain uniform inefficiency does not require an extremely precise information about consumption plans (and, possibly, preferences) of individuals. This sort of robustness seems crucial to motivate policy intervention on the ground of a failure of competitive markets. Contrarily, non-uniform inefficiency might disappear under small perturbations, so that its verification requires the exact knowledge of consumption plans and preferences of individuals.
To establish persistence of uniform inefficiency, an additional assumption is introduced. This basically requires that, whenever a feasible redistribution Pareto improves upon a given allocation, any expansion of the former along the average aggregate endowment Pareto dominates a sufficiently small expansion of the latter along the average aggregate endowment. More precisely, an allocation x in X, with aggregate endowment e in L, is robustly improvable if, given any allocation z in X that Pareto dominates allocation x in X, satisfying i∈G z i ≤ i∈G x i , for every sufficiently small > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, for every individual i in G,
where e i is the algebraic projection of e in L into L i . For instance, in an economy with homothetic preferences, if every individual consumes a non-negligible share of the average aggregate endowment, any allocation is robustly improvable.
Proposition 2 (Robust inefficiency).
A robustly improvable allocation x in X is uniformly inefficient only if there exists η > 0 such that every allocation y in N η (x) is uniformly inefficient.
In the following section, which might be regarded as a digression, I shall provide an equivalent characterization of uniform efficiency in terms of supporting positive linear functionals.
Duality
An interesting feature of the modified notion of efficiency is that it admits an equivalent characterization in terms of supporting linear functionals. Relevantly, such an equivalence fails for the canonical notion of efficiency, that is, removing the interiority assumption. In particular, an inefficient allocation might still admit a supporting linear functional.
Given the aggregate endowment e in L, endow the vector space L (e) with the corresponding supremum norm (see footnote 3). This is a sort of reduced commodity space. Let L (e) be the norm dual of L (e)
where z x means that allocation z in X weakly Pareto dominates allocation x in X. Remarkably, uniform efficiency of an allocation is equivalent to its supportability by means of a positive linear functional on the reduced commodity space.
Proposition 3 (Duality). An allocation x in X is uniformly efficient if and only if it is supported by a (non-vanishing
, where e in L is the aggregate endowment.
Support by linear functionals is a property of some interest. Indeed, in economies with finitely many individuals, under acceptable restrictions on fundamentals, efficiency is equivalent to support by linear functionals. In economies of overlapping generations, the same equivalence obtains for the notion of uniform efficiency. This shows that uniform efficiency is not arbitrarily conceived, as it corresponds to the natural extension of a property, that is equivalent to efficiency in economies with finitely many individuals, to an economy of overlapping generations. In other terms, it is the only modified notion of efficiency that preserves the equivalence with the support by linear functionals. A further exploration of implications of this property is beyond the scope of this paper.
Supporting Prices
A price p is an element of P , the positive cone of L, with evaluation
Values are allowed to be infinite. However, a price p in P defines a positive linear functional on L i for every individual i in G.
An allocation x in X is supported by price p in P if, given any allocation z in X, for every individual i in G,
Clearly, by local non-satiation of preferences, for every individual i in G,
Also, notice that, by monotonicity of preferences, a supporting price p in P is strictly positive. Price support is strengthened in part of the analysis. Some additional restrictions on preferences of all individuals are to be satisfied on some uniform neighborhood of the supported allocation. To this purpose, I shall consider a strictly positive element u of L, which is interpreted as the unitary endowment of commodities. The vector space L (u) is endowed with the corresponding supremum norm, defined by
As u is a strictly positive element of L, this supremum norm is virtually a norm on L i for every individual i in G. So, given an allocation x in X, for any > 0, let
This is a closed ball centered at the allocation x in X in the introduced supremum norm. Notice the different roles of the aggregate endowment and of the unitary endowment (e and u in L, respectively), each inducing a supremum norm on the corresponding reduced commodity space (L (e) and L (u), respectively). Clearly, in a non-growing economy, the aggregate endowment e is an element of L (u), so that it would suffice to consider neighborhoods in the supremum norm induced by the aggregate endowment. The following hypotheses restrict preferences uniformly with respect to the norm induced by the unitary endowment.
An allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is smoothly supported by price p in P if, for every 1 > ρ > 0, there exists > 0 such that, given any allocation z in B (x), for every individual i in G,
In fact, smooth support requires that, for every 1 > ρ > 0, locally, the (translated) convex cone
. This is a mild requirement for a single individual, so that the restriction is substantial only insofar as it holds uniformly for all individuals. It is similar to the common hypothesis of bounded curvature of indifference surfaces in the literature.
Lemma 1 (Smooth support). If utility functions are C 1 -smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and (simply) quasi-concave, the requirement of smooth support is satisfied for every single individual at an interior consumption plan.

Remark 1 (Smooth support and net trades). The hypothesis of smooth support will be used in order to establish sufficiency of the Modified Cass Criterion for uniform inefficiency (proposition 5). It is to be noticed that it is stronger than necessary. In fact, it would suffice to assume that, for every individual i in G with consumption space X i ⊂ L t ×L t+1 , it holds true only at net trades having, respectively, a negative
In order to assess the restrictiveness of smooth support, I shall show that it is implied by the hypothesis of bounded curvature (BC) of indifference surfaces. An allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is (BC)-supported by price p in P if, for some sufficiently small > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, given any allocation z in B (x), for every individual i in G,
where t (i) in T denotes the first period of activity of the individual i in G. This notion is adopted, for instance, by [4, 5, 11, 14, 15] . Remark 1 applies also in this case.
Lemma 2 (Smooth support and bounded curvature). An allocation x in X is (BC)-supported by price p in P only if it is smoothly supported by price p in P .
Similarly to the hypothesis of bounded curvature, smooth support basically imposes a sufficient degree of commodity substitution, preventing preferences from approaching some form of extreme complementarity. If preferences of every individual i in G are represented by a C 2 -smooth utility function
smooth support is guaranteed by the existence, for some > 0, of a sufficiently large δ > 0 such that, given any allocation z in B (x), for every individual i in G,
In turn, such a condition obtains if second derivatives are uniformly bounded on some neighborhood of the given allocation, provided that relative prices of commodities are non-vanishing over consecutive periods of trade. For practical purposes, this is a simple criterion. As a supplement (in appendix B), I shall discuss smooth support for utilities with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). In fact, in order to obtain a smooth support, it suffices to assume that consumption of all individuals in all relevant commodities is uniformly bounded from below and form above by strictly positive constants. This is an acceptably restrictive requirement. The upper bound could be motivated by a bounded aggregate endowment. A positive lower bound for consumption in the first period is typically assumed in order to obtain sufficiency of the Cass Criterion in the literature (for instance, [11, Theorem 2, condition (i)] or [14, Theorem 2, condition (b)]). In economies with CES utilities, this yields a positive lower bound for consumption in the second period, for instance, under the assumption of non-vanishing relative prices of commodities over any pair of consecutive periods of trade.
An allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is strictly supported by price p in P if, for some sufficiently small > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that, given any allocation z in B (x), for every individual i in G,
where t (i) in T denotes the first period of activity of the individual i in G. Strict support requires that, locally, the weakly preferred set z i ∈ X i : z i i x i be contained in the convex set
It corresponds to the hypothesis of non-vanishing curvature of indifference surfaces in the literature. Incidentally, notice that it implies (quadratic) strict convexity of preferences. 
Lemma 3 (Strict support
Remark 2 (Strict support and uniform inefficiency). Importantly, strict support will not be used in order to establish necessity of the Modified Cass Criterion (proposition 4), as instead the hypothesis of non-vanishing curvature for necessity of the canonical Cass Criterion. It is only exploited for a comparison with the literature (proposition 7).
Equivalent Characterization
Competitive prices convey information about efficiency of the allocation of resources. In fact, I shall here provide an equivalent characterization of uniform inefficiency in terms of supporting prices. In particular, under rather mild additional restrictions, I shall show that uniform inefficiency is equivalent to a sort of Modified Cass Criterion,
where e in L denotes the aggregate endowment. Thus, in an economy with an aggregate endowment growing at a constant rate, uniform inefficiency occurs if and only if the rate of interest falls below the rate of growth of the economy in the long-period. The Modified Cass Criterion implies that, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every t in T ,
This is the fundamental inequality that will be used to establish sufficiency. In addition, it can be easily showed that lim inf
Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition in this note is stricter than that defined by the traditional Cass Criterion, as the set of uniformly inefficient allocations is contained in the set of inefficient allocations. Necessity straightly obtains without additional restrictions. Indeed, when uniform inefficiency occurs, in every truncated economy, a hypothetical planner might achieve a Pareto improvement, destroying a positive fraction, 1 > > 0, of the aggregate endowment, by compensating the last generation in its first period of activity. This compensation requires at most the aggregate endowment in the last period of the truncated economy. By Pareto improvement, the aggregate value of this redistribution of resources is positive. Thus, at every t in T ,
Hence, the Modified Cass Criterion is satisfied.
Proposition 4 (Necessity). An allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P , is uniformly inefficient only if
where e in L is the aggregate endowment.
To obtain sufficiency, the hypothesis of smooth support is employed. 5 In the aggregate, welfare improving transfers are very simple. For some sufficiently small > 0, in every period t in T , a share of current resources,
is transferred from the generation in the first period of activity to the generation in the second period of activity. These shares are non-vanishing and, by the Modified Cass Criterion, non-exploding. In addition, roughly speaking, smooth support ensures that such transfers are welfare improving, as, by the Modified Cass Criterion, for every generation t in T ,
Thus, the ρ-discounted value of positive net trades (i.e., the term in the left handside) exceeds the value of negative net trades (i.e., the term on the right hand-side). Also, a small destruction of transferred resources preserves welfare improvement. Additional restrictions, that I shall present below, guarantee that such simple transfers are feasible in the aggregate and can be disaggregate among members of every generation, so as to respect the local nature of the hypothesis of smooth support.
An allocation x in X, with aggregate endowment e in L, is simply connected if there exists a sufficiently small η > 0 satisfying ηe ≤ t∈T i∈G t+1
Thus, an allocation is simply connected if and only if, in every period of trade, a constant share of the aggregate endowment can be transferred from the generation in its first period of activity to the generation in its second period of activity. This guarantees feasibility of the described simple transfers.
An allocation x in X, with aggregate endowment e in L, is bounded if there exists a sufficiently large µ > 0 satisfying
(e t + e t+1 ) ≤ µu and t∈T i∈Gt+1
where γ t denotes the cardinality of generation t in T . In an economy with an upper bound on the cardinality of generations, an allocation is bounded whenever the aggregate endowment is bounded (that is, there exists a sufficiently large µ > 0 satisfying e ≤ µu). However, the hypothesis of a bounded allocation is consistent with a growing aggregate endowment, along with a growing cardinality of generations. Indeed, an allocation is bounded if the average aggregate endowment is bounded and, in addition, no individual becomes dominant in terms of consumption in the corresponding generation. Both restrictions are necessary, as, otherwise, the proposed transfers would require extremely large modifications of the consumption plans of some individuals.
Proposition 5 (Sufficiency).
A bounded and simply connected allocation x in X, with smoothly supporting price p in P , is uniformly inefficient if
For completeness, the following proposition clarifies the exact relation between competitive prices and supporting linear functionals for uniformly efficient allocations. In fact, supporting linear functionals correspond to some appropriate limits of competitive prices. 
, where e in L is the aggregate endowment and, for every 
A relevant implication of vanishing trades is that the canonical social security system would not deliver a welfare improvement upon a uniformly efficient allocation which is not efficient. Oppositely, as discussed in the previous section, when allocation is uniformly inefficient, a welfare improvement obtains through an extremely simple policy consisting in transferring part of the endowment of every individual from the first period to the second period of economic activity, remunerating such a transfer at the (corrected) real rate of interest prevailing in the market.
Remarks
Natural extensions of the analysis in this paper include heterogenous horizons for generations and uncertainty. By a canonical argument (Balasko, Cass and Shell [3] ), every economy of overlapping generations can be reduced to a simple economy with generations overlapping over a single period only, as those studied in this paper. However, in this transformation, strict monotonicity of preferences is not preserved, so that not all established results extend straightly. It is worth noticing that, in the analysis, I have made a limited use of strict monotonicity, which is basically employed only for the smooth support hypothesis (lemma 1) and, hence, for the construction of simple welfare improving transfers (proposition 5 and, indirectly, propositions 6-7). Thus, more general economies could be encompassed by weakening smooth support, along the lines of Molina-Abraldes and Pintos-Clapés [14] . Uncertainty could instead require an adaptation of the notion of uniform inefficiency, so as to admit, for instance, a uniform destruction of resources only along some branches of the event tree.
The techniques developed in this paper have analogous applications in economies of capital accumulation, under general descriptions of technologies. Uniform inefficiency could correspond to the existence of an alternative accumulation plan yielding higher products, over all periods of trade, notwithstanding a small uniform destruction of the social endowment of primary factors of production and, possibly, of the initial stock of capital goods. The adaptation could require to take into account the long-run behavior of prices of primary factors of production, the aggregate endowment, and of prices of reproducible commodities.
Finally, it could be of some interest a systematic study of robust inefficiency or verifying some sort of generic coincidence between uniform and canonical inefficiency.
[16] S.F. Richard and S. Srivastava. Equilibrium in economies with infinitely many consumers and infinitely many commodities. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17, 9-21, 1988.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. If allocation x in X is uniformly inefficient, then it is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation v in X satisfying, for some η > 0,
Letting z in X be defined, for every i in G, by
Clearly, by (weak) monotonicity of preferences, allocation z in X Pareto dominates allocation x in X. In addition, given any y in N η (z), for every individual i in G, As far as the reverse implication is concerned, assuming that 1 > η > 0, consider the allocation y in X defined, for every i in G, by
where γ ≥ γ t for every t in T . It follows that t∈T γ t i∈G t
so that allocation y is an element of N η (z). Thus, allocation y in X Pareto dominates allocation x in X and, aggregating,
so proving the claim.
Proof of proposition 2. Allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation v in X satisfying, for some sufficiently small > 0,
Consider the allocation z in X defined, for every individual i in G, by
In addition, let δ > 0 be given by the hypothesis of robust improvement at > 0 and peg any sufficiently small η > 0 satisfying min { , δ} > η. Notice that
e t − (3 ) e ≤ − e.
In addition, for every allocation y in N η (x),
Therefore,
In addition, for every individual i in G,
Hence, by (weak) monotonicity of preferences, z i i y i , so proving the claim.
Proof of lemma 1. Assume that the utility function U i : X i → R is C 1 -smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and (simply) quasi-concave. By supportability, at an interior consumption plan, there is µ i > 0 such that, for every h i in L i ,
At no loss of generality, assume that µ i = 1. In addition, by Taylor Decomposition, for every z i in X i , Pegging any 1 > ρ > 0, I shall show that the requirement of smooth supportability is satisfied by some > 0. Suppose that, for every sufficiently small > 0, the set , with z i lying in K i for every sufficiently small > 0, satisfying
Possibly extracting a subsequence, one might assume that the sequence
converges to some h i in L i with h i = 1. This, observing that
As p is strictly positive on L i , p · |h| > 0, which shows a contradiction.
Proof of lemma 2. For some > 0, the hypothesis of (BC)-support is satisfied by some δ > 0. Peg any 1 > ρ > 0 and let
For any consumption plan
